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3 Self-Overcoming in Foucault's 
Discipline and Punish 
LADELLE McWHORTER 
Prisons are veritable universities of crime. Within them young offenders 
learn both the values and the techniques of hardened criminals. In addi-
tion to these lessons in professional ethics and theory, aspiring criminals 
also get hands-on experience within prison walls, for prisons are also 
centers of criminal activity: drug and arms trafficking, rape, gang war-
fare, and murder. And, like all good universities, prisons help their prote-
ges make the contacts they need to further their budding careers. 
Few will disagree that our prison system, along with its subsidiary 
mechanisms, produces the conditions under which delinquency can spread 
and flourish. But Michel Foucault's assertion in Discipline and Punish is 
far stronger than that. Foucault is not just reiterating the familiar claim 
that prisons produce a medium for the development of delinquency, rather, 
he is claiming that our disciplinary society actually produces the delin-
quent self in its very being. 
It is said that the prison fabricated delinquents; it is true that it brings 
back, almost inevitably, before the courts those who have been sent 
there. But it also fabricates them in the sense that it has introduced into 
the operation of the law and the offence, the judge and the offender, the 
condemned man and the executioner, the non-corporeal reality of the 
delinquency that links them together and, for a century and a half, has 
caught them in the same trap. 1 
Delinquency itself-as a functional locus within a discourse but also as a 
possible form of selfhood, as a way of being, as a way of being known 
and of knowing oneself-arose simultaneously with and is sustained and 
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perpetuated by what Foucault calls the carceral system. Delinquency and 
the prison system are the twin offspring of the same series of events, the 
same movement of power. 
Foucault offers two sorts of evidence for his assertion that the very 
being of the delinquent is a product of a certain series of events within a 
network of power. First, he notes the lack of the figure of the delinquent 
prior to the dramatic rise in the use of incarceration as a form of punish-
ment in Western Europe. Before the advent of prison systems with their 
internal hierarchies and structures of correction and their attendant psy-
chiatric and medical knowledges and practices, legal proceedings and 
techniques of punishment focused primarily on an act or series of acts. 
Criminality was merely a matter of action, not a state of being, and pun-
ishment was its counteraction. But as a carceral system develops, we find 
that the central focus of judicial administration is not action, but rather 
self, the true being of the one who acts offensively. Actions are consid-
ered only insofar as they function to initiate contact between the delin-
quent and the correctional system and insofar as they are understood to be 
the true expression of an underlying reality. Delinquency functions as the 
name of that reality. 
In addition to delinquency's absence prior to the widespread use of 
imprisonment to punish offenders, Foucault offers another piece of evi-
dence to support his notion that delinquency is produced within a certain 
configuration of power relations. He points out how very useful delin-
quency is and, as a result, how very invested in its existence certain 
mechanisms of power are. 
Delinquency is indirectly useful because it represents such an im-
provement over popular, sporadic unlawfulness. The existence of a class 
of people who claim illegality as their own prerogative necessarily limits 
the unlawful activity of the general population. Once delinquency was 
defined and reified, a sorting process could occur. Delinquents, unlike 
sporadically rowdy citizens, could be identified, watched, and managed. 
Delinquency also has its direct uses. Occasionally delinquents have 
been used as a population and labor force to colonize conquered territo-
ries. More often, they have been used as a sort of covert labor force at 
home, available for employment by legitimate private businesses or 
various state agencies to work on the fringes of legality-as smugglers, 
prostitutes, odds-makers, informants, and spies. A prominent example 
from recent history of the direct use of delinquency by a legitimate 
agency is the C.I.A.'s employment of General Manuel Noriega and his 
underlings in Central America. But we need not look to the sensational 
case for corroboration of Foucault's claim. We need only consider how 
often prostitutes are used in the negotiation of business deals or petty 
thugs are employed by collection agencies. Delinquents perform valued 
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services that result in power and profits for people whose own reputa-
tions are clean. 
Delinquents are not only legally marginal laborers; they are also 
auxiliary police. Crime normalizes. Crime in the ghettos keeps racial and 
ethnic minorities frightened and disorganized; thus they cannot effec-
tively challenge the oppression perpetrated against them by dominant so-
cial groups. The existence of thugs and thieves who confine themselves 
primarily to ethnic and working class neighborhoods helps to determine 
property values and thereby ensures continued segregation by race and 
class. Rapists help keep women in our "place" by literally curtailing our 
activities and by making us feel dependent upon the protection of men.2 
But beyond their use as terrorists, hitmen, spies, or informants, de-
linquents perform another service. They serve as objects of knowledge. 
Foucault writes, "in fabricating delinquency, it [disciplinary power] gave 
to criminal justice a unitary field of objects, authenticated by the 'sci-
ences,' and thus enabled it to function on a general horizon of 'truth"' 
(DP 256). In other words, certain knowledges themselves, namely the 
human sciences, have a direct interest in the fabrication and continued 
existence of their object of study, the delinquent individual. 
Delinquents are so very useful, it would seem, that if they did not 
already exist, society would have had to invent them. Indeed, that is just 
Foucault's point. Foucault's target for destabilization in Discipline and 
Punish, however, it not just our carceral system. The trap is set for much 
bigger prey. 
Enter the will to truth. If Foucault is right, we may say in outrage, 
then a terrible thing has occurred: people have been victimized by disci-
plinary powers that have created false identities for them. Whatever their 
"real" truth, young men and women have been prodded, pressed, and 
brainwashed into behaving like criminals and even into believing that 
criminality formed the core of their very souls. Delinquency does not 
exist, but for a century and a half we have all been made to believe that it 
does and to act accordingly, with disastrous results. Something must be 
done. 
Let us consider this outrage and the assumptions that underlie and 
drive it. The first important assumption is that fundamentally humanity 
occurs as individuals, each with his or her own true core identity that is 
untouched by power except a posteriori and negatively. The second im-
portant assumption, which is interrelated with the first, is that power is 
antithetical to truth; this leads to the conclusion that we must be suspi-
cious of any claim to truth if it is clear that the claim is in the interest of 
some power. 
As bearers of a classical liberal legacy, we are predisposed to as-
sume that whatever is traversed by power is also corrupted by it. Power, 
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we tend to believe, distorts truth. If an event, a thing, or a way of being 
human cannot be separated from functions of power, then we feel fairly 
certain that we are not in possession of truth with regard to that event, 
thing, or person. Therefore, if we become persuaded that delinquency is 
thoroughly permeated by power, we tend to lose faith in its reality. While 
reading Discipline and Punish, then, we may begin to suspect that the 
truth of the individuals treated as delinquents has been lost completely 
beneath a truthless discursive overlay. Delinquents are not really delin-
quents, rather they are victims of oppression. 
That view, however, is not likely to appeal to those of us who have 
known delinquents, attended school with them, worked with them, or 
have had blood ties with them. At times, some may seem to be victims of 
a system that casts them into a role in violation of their own natures. But 
more frequently, delinquents do not seem like victims except perhaps in 
some very abstract, theoretical sense; they seem, instead, like people who 
choose to live as they do just as nondelinquents choose to live as they do. 
And that, given our tendency to see power as a violation of truth, 
should come as a fairly disturbing thought. For it implies this: either we 
are all victims of oppressive forces and our truth is hidden from us per-
haps irrevocably, or delinquents are real beings, true beings fabricated by 
power. 
The text pursues the latter possibility. The very being of the delin-
quent is a matter of production, it asserts. Furthermore, delinquency is not 
the only form of selfhood that may be analyzed as a production of disci-
plinary regimes. There is also the soldier, the factory worker, the school-
child, and, the text insinuates, the family member. These beings, these 
persons, also are produced through disciplinary mechanisms. These ways 
of being selves are also invested and contoured by networks of power. 
Delinquency is far from a singular occurrence. In fact, Foucault asserts, 
"[t]his book is intended as a correlative history of the modern soul ... " 
(DP 23). Not just delinquents, but everyone is placed in question here. 
Discipline and Punish is not a discourse about what is external to its 
readers and author; it is a discourse whose movement encompasses and 
places in question every one of us. 
The first prospect was unsettling enough: that perhaps we are all so 
traversed-in even the most ordinary, most intimate or characteristic ex-
pressions of ourselves-by normalizing disciplinary power that we are all 
ignorant of our own truth, that all our efforts to know ourselves are 
illusory failures. But the second prospect, that the "truth" of the indi-
vidual may in fact just be configurations of power, is far more unsettling. 
For how is the will to truth to appropriate and conform itself to the 
"truth" that there is no stable, unitary truth of the individual human soul 
apart from historical, productive power? We would, perhaps, rather place 
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our hope on the first prospect and assume that we just do not have the 
real truth about ourselves. As Foucault's text unfolds, however, the sec-
ond prospect takes on greater and greater plausibility. We are forced, by 
the power of our own desire for truth, to open our thinking to the possi-
bility that the human individual may itself be a historical event, a product 
of power relations. We will follow this thought's unfolding through the 
rest of this chapter. 
First of all, we willing self-knowers might ask, how could a disci-
plinary regime create individuality? Foucault offers a careful and con-
vincing analysis. He suggests three mutually reinforcing modes of 
production of individuality: hierarchical observation, normalizing judg-
ment, and the technique of the examination. 
First we see a shift in architecture. Buildings are to function as 
machines in which observation may take place, for observation in itself 
becomes a means of control. Hospitals become machines for controlling 
contagion, and thus the conduct of those infected. Factories become ma-
chines for controlling production by controlling the laborers within them. 
Schools become machines for controlling the development of children. 
The form of power that invests these architectural apparatuses is not mod-
eled after the top to bottom power of a sovereign king; power comes to 
function within these institutions automatically, anonymously, and con-
tinuously. "Discipline makes possible the operation of a relational power 
that sustains itself by its own mechanisms and which, for the spectacle of 
public events, substitutes the uninterrupted play of calculated gazes" (DP 
177). A network of power is formed in which a certain set of spaces are 
marked out, across which human beings are distributed. One is identified 
by the space one occupies, and one is kept in that space and brought into 
conformity with that identity through the subtly physical, though 
noncorporeal, method of constant ordered observation. 
Observation is closely related to normalization. Observation of per-
sons makes possible a ranking system in which persons are compared to 
one another and to a set of standards. Deviation from the standards or 
failure to progress upward through the established ranks in the allotted 
time is grounds for punishment. Once such a system is in place and 
functioning, however, the sort of punishment it offers is simply its own 
reassertion. The schoolboy who fails to remember his catechism is pun-
ished by being lowered in class rank. The norm or standard that the child 
must attain spreads itself out both spatially and temporally in terms of 
gradations, expectations for progress, and physical location so that the 
child who fails does not violate the normalizing system or escape it, but 
merely remains within it, demoted, marked by its judgment. The disci-
plinary technique of normalization not only defines the good, the right, or 
the proper, but also the bad, the wrong, and the improper all on a long 
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continuum of gradation from which there is no escape. There is no out-
side to normalizing networks, and there is no gap in them, only a gapless 
series of ranks. Within such a network every stage of development, every 
possible state of being, can be identified. 
Finally, "the examination combines the techniques of an observing 
hierarchy and those of a normalizing judgment" (DP 184). Examination is 
the technique of differentiation; it is the mechanism for distribution of 
persons across a graded and gapless continuum. "In this space of domina-
tion, disciplinary power manifests its potency, essentially, by arranging 
objects. The examination is, as it were, the ceremony of this objectifica-
tion" (DP 187). Most significant, it is the examination that first inserts the 
patient, the schoolchild, the soldier, or the prisoner into a system of 
writing. Records must be kept of the course of disease, of the progress of 
training, or of rehabilitation. 
Thanks to the whole apparatus of writing that accompanies it, the ex-
amination opened up two correlative possibilities: firstly, the constitu-
tion of the individual as a describable, analyzable object, not in order to 
reduce him to "specific" features, as did the naturalists in relation to 
living things, but in order to maintain him in his individual features, in 
his particular evolution, in his own aptitudes or abilities, under the gaze 
of a permanent corpus of knowledge; and, secondly, the constitution of a 
comparative system that made possible the measurement of overall phe-
nomena, the description of groups, the characterization of collective 
facts, the calculation of the gaps between individuals, their distribution 
in a given "population." (DP 190) 
Thus each human being, thoroughly individualized and maintained in his 
or her individuality, becomes a "case." He or she is both an object of 
knowledge and an identifiable, locatable target for power. The individual 
"may be described, judged, measured, compared with others" (DP 191 ). 
And, at the same time, the individual may "be trained or corrected, classi-
fied, normalized, excluded, etc." (DP 191). 
Prior to the establishment of disciplinary power, only heroes-kings, 
generals, or saints-were marked out as individuals whose lives might be 
documented and who might feel themselves to be unique. Within disci-
plinary regimes, however, individuality is created and enforced for all 
persons. Self-identity is produced and persons are fixed by it, unable to 
transgress it. Within disciplinary systems, each person is observed, exam-
ined, judged, and documented in his or her precise degree of deviation 
from the norm. Thus individuality just is deviance. To be an individual 
just is to occupy a particular place with regard to a set of norms and to 
own a history of such particular occupations in a documented order. As 
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such, individuality can exist only within a network of power relations 
wherein norms and hierarchies are strictly maintained. The modern indi-
vidual is a creation of disciplinary techniques. 
This point cannot be overstressed because our inclination will be to 
disregard its significance. Our own will to truth, the will that informs us in 
our very being, will insist upon its own object, its raison d'etre: a true self-
identical core of being analytically separable from and logically prior to 
power. Taking Foucault seriously, then, when he suggests that such an a priori 
self-identical core does not exist, will threaten that will's very existence. 
Insofar as we are that will to truth, if we find ourselves thinking 
within the plausibility of Foucault's account of individuality, we will at-
tempt to think the historicity of individuality as the "truth" of the indi-
vidual. That move will probably occur as follows. First, we will assume 
that individuals exist self-identically through time. Then we will assume 
that the ahistorical truth of ourselves as individuals is that we were fabri-
cated within power mechanisms and are sustained by them. We will disci-
pline ourselves to that truth, attempt to force ourselves to identify with 
that truth, to become that truth, to "own" it. The real truth of individual 
selfhood, we will say, is that it cannot be understood separately from 
power. We will, however, maintain the reality of that truth apart from 
power and thus we will fail to place in question truth itself, the notion 
that there are stable identities that can be known apart from any context 
of valuation, of power. 
Such a move, however, will only end in frustration because within 
Foucault's discourse it will not bring us to stable ground. Once we realize 
that the movement toward self-identical individuality is itself the move of 
a disciplinary regime, we must also realize that to insist that the true 
identity of individuality is its historicity and its location within a power 
regime is simply to replicate that disciplinary power. Any insistence on a 
stable identity for a human self, whether that stable identity is the identity 
of the delinquent or the identity of a power-traversed historical subjectiv-
ity, is a move undertaken from within disciplinary power and not in viola-
tion of it. In other words, this new claim to truth-that the individual is a 
creation of power-is not innocent of power. On its own terms, it is a 
self-violating claim. 
Thus the text disrupts our move to reinstate the notion of a truth 
dissociated from power and refuses to allow us to leave unquestioned the 
notion that power and truth are mutually repulsive. Perhaps, Foucault 
writes, 
we should abandon a whole tradition that allows us to imagine that 
knowledge can exist only where the power relations are suspended and 
that knowledge can develop only outside its injunctions, its demands 
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and its interests. Perhaps we should abandon the belief that power 
makes mad and that, by the same token, the renunciation of power is 
one of the conditions of knowledge. We should admit rather that power 
produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it because it is 
useful); that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there 
is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of 
knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute 
at the same time power relations. (DP 27) 
We are not, so this text tells us, going to find a truth of our selves that is 
free of networks of power. Even the truth that we are not going to find a 
truth of our selves that is free of networks of power is not free of these 
networks. 
We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in 
negative terms: it 'excludes,' it 'represses,' it 'censors,' it 'abstracts,' it 
'masks,' it 'conceals.' In fact, power produces; it produces reality; 
it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and 
the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production. 
(DP 194) 
For centuries we Westerners believed that we must come to know 
ourselves in our ownmost truth. Only thus can we be saved; only thus can 
we be mentally healthy; only thus can we battle the powers of oppression 
that surround us in the gathering darkness. Foucault's discourse places in 
question our belief that there is a true self, apart from historical power 
networks, that we can come to know. But worse, his discourse places in 
question our drive to know. Our will to truth, to the truth of ourselves, 
maintains itself by asserting that there is a truth toward which it strives. 
In the absence of such a truth, the will to truth-which to a great extent is 
what we are-cannot remain in being. 
Within the unfolding of Foucault's discourse, as we have said, the 
will to truth will attempt to maintain itself by asserting that the truth of 
self is power. But that assertion cannot maintain its own stability, for 
what it amounts to is an assertion that the pure core of self-identity sim-
ply is impurely self-identical, precisely because it is an a posteriori con-
struction of power. 
Furthermore, the drive to identify has already been exposed as a 
disciplinary drive, not a Galahadesque search for pure self undertaken in 
purity. To remain what it is, however, to maintain itself in its own iden-
tity, the drive to know, the will to truth cannot own itself as power; it 
cannot own its own creativity, nor can it own its own interestedness. If 
the "truth" of the will to truth is its affinity with what it has named 
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untruth, then it is disrupted in its movement, since it is forced, compelled 
by its own energy, to accept as truth that it has no truth. 
This, of course, is a paradox. It amounts to perpetual violation, 
disruption, and frustration of the drive to know. Foucault's discourse is 
the labyrinth in which the will to truth is led to turn against itself. It is a 
movement that folds back upon what moves it. It is the energy of our will 
to know folding back over upon itself-again and again and again. The 
text's movement is the will to truth turning against, over, and through 
itself. The text is fundamentally self-violating and self-overcoming, not 
just because it destabilizes the notion of self, but, more important, be-
cause it places in question the very power of the text itself. It is the text 
qua text that is undergoing destabilization within the text. 
The thesis of this chapter is that self-overcoming is not simply to be 
looked for, to be located and analyzed, within Foucault's texts, but rather 
that Foucault's texts may be read as self-overcomings, as pure motion, as 
overcoming-occurring. Foucault's discourse runs counter to power and 
instigates the overcoming of certain structures of power, for example, the 
ascetic self; but Foucault's discourse also is power, and its truth is contin-
gent upon and supportive of that power. Thus it is a discourse that bares 
its neck before its own analytic knife; it is a discourse that embraces its 
own mortality. In its agitative action it dissolves itself. It is a discourse 
that, in proper-that is, in perverse-Nietzschean fashion, ends by biting 
its own tail-simultaneously, of course, swallowing in advance any com-
mentary that would claim to have offered a true account of the self-
overcoming movement it manifests. 
